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Abstract
Deductibles in health insurance generate nonlinear budget sets and dy-
namic incentives. This paper uses detailed individual claims data from
a large Swiss insurance company to estimate the response in health care
demand to the discrete price increase that is generated by resetting the
deductible at the start of each calendar year. We use a regression dis-
continuity type framework based on daily data to estimate the change in
health care demand right before and right after the turn of the year. We
find that for individuals with high deductibles health care demand drops
by 27%, which translates into an elasticity of −.21. The decrease is most
pronounced for inpatient care and prescription drugs. By contrast, for
individuals with low deductibles there is no significant change in health
care demand (except for prescription drugs). A remaining open question is
whether the observed behavioral responses can be attributed to intertem-
poral substitution or whether they constitute a classic moral hazard effect.
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1 Introduction
The microeconomic analysis of the demand for health care is important and in-
teresting for at least two reasons. First, from an efficiency point of view, there
is the question of how price sensitive this demand is conditional on health, be-
cause health insurance reduces the price of health care for patients and may
induce moral hazard. Second, most health insurance plans feature non-linear
price schedules due to deductibles and stop-losses. The analysis of consumers’
behavior in the presence of non-linear pricing is an important and challenging
topic for applied work. Apart from health care demand, examples include elec-
tricity (Borenstein, 2009; Ito, forthcoming) and water demand (Ito, 2013). These
papers usually find that individuals seem to respond to average rather than to
marginal prices, if they respond at all. Also closely related is the analysis of
labor supply in the presence of non-linear taxation (Hausman, 1985; Saez, 2010;
Chetty et al., 2011).
In health economics, there is a large literature on estimating the price sensi-
tivity of health care demand. The first reliable estimates of this price sensitivity
were obtained in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which was run
during the 1970s. Aron-Dine et al. (2013) provide an account of the HIE and
a re-analysis of the experimental data within the modern causal analysis frame-
work. Their estimates of the demand elasticity comparing full insurance with
several plans containing different degrees of cost-sharing are in the range of −0.1
to −0.2. This of course corresponds to the well-known benchmark estimate of
roughly −0.2 reported in Keeler and Rolph (1988). Their analysis is based on the
assumption that individuals are fully myopic and base their health care demand
on the spot price, ignoring the non-linearity of the budget constraint created by
a stop-loss.1
More recent approaches explicitly take the non-linear pricing into account,
but assume perfect forward-looking behavior. Examples include Kowalski (2012),
Marsh (2013) and Einav et al. (2013b). Aron-Dine et al. (2012) are the first to
explicitly test for forward-looking behavior. They exploit that individuals enter-
ing a health plan during a calendar year have less time to accumulate health care
expenditure and therefore have a smaller probability of reaching the deductible.
Hence these individuals face a higher expected end-of-year price compared to
those who already were in the health plan at the beginning of the year. They
1To be precise, Keeler and Rolph (1988) assume that agents have perfect foresight regarding
medical care within an illness episode, but do not consider the possibility of future health
shocks.
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find that initial demand is lower for individuals who face the same marginal price
but higher expected end-of-year prices. Einav et al. (2013a) apply the same basic
idea to drug expenditure in Medicare Part D. They find significant bunching of
annual spending around the convex kink in the budget set created by the famous
Part D “donut hole”, which is evidence for a static price response. They also
document a dynamic price response in the sense that initial drug use is lower for
individuals in the same contract who face the same initial spot price of drugs
but higher expected end-of-year prices.
For Switzerland, there is a series of papers that analyze the effect of de-
ductibles on health care demand. Examples include Gerfin and Schellhorn (2006)
and Trottmann et al. (2012). However, to our knowledge, only Boes and Gerfin
(2013) explicitly estimate an elasticity of health care demand for Switzerland.
Their analysis is based on a quasi-experimental setup where part of the clients
of a Swiss insurance provider were subject to full insurance for a limited time.
Their baseline estimate of the price elasticity is −.14.
Our analysis exploits the institutional regulation that deductibles apply to
a calendar year and reset to the initial level at the start of the new year. This
generates a discrete jump in the price of medical care for individuals who have
hit their deductible in the old year. We use a regression discontinuity type frame-
work based on daily insurance-claims data to estimate the change in health care
demand right before and right after the turn of the year. We find that for indi-
viduals with high deductibles health care demand drops by 27%, which translates
into an elasticity of −.21. The decrease is most pronounced for inpatient care
and prescription drugs. By contrast, for individuals with low deductibles, there
is no significant change in health care demand, with the exception of prescription
drugs.
Common to virtually all empirical estimates of the elasticity of health care
demand is that annual outcomes are studied. By contrast, our analysis is based
on daily health care expenditure and daily prices. This allows us to identify
the behavioral change at the moment of the price change. This is our major
contribution to the literature. Of course, this begs the question of comparability
with the literature. Our results are informative about behavioral responses in
the presence of price changes caused by the institutional setting. However, it
turns out to be difficult to separate the observed responses into a true moral
hazard effect (health care that would not have been consumed if the price was
higher) and an intertemporal substitution effect (health care that would have
been consumed next year instead of this year). In this sense, our results may be
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difficult to compare with the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a the-
oretical framework describing individuals’ behavioral response to a discrete jump
in the price for medical care at the end of the year. In Section 3, we summarize
the institutional background. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis: we ex-
plain the construction of the dataset, present descriptive statistics, discuss the
evolution of the spot price and health care costs, describe the empirical frame-
work, and discuss the main results (in Section 4.5). Section 5 contains some
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Framework
We consider a two-period framework, in which agents choose a health insurance
plan before the start of each period. We refer to these periods as years, and
each year consists of T subperiods (e.g. days) denoted by t = 1, 2, ..., T . Hence,
there are 2T subperiods, with T + 1 the first subperiod in the second year. For
simplicity, assume that there are only two health plans, one with a low deductible
and one with a high deductible and a lower premium. Common to both plans
is a co-payment rate γ, which applies to all health care expenditure exceeding
the deductible (i.e. there is no stop-loss). We do not model plan choice, but
assume that agents choose the plan that maximizes expected utility during the
deductible period.
Individuals derive utility from medical care m and a composite consumption
good c. The utility function in subperiod t is given by
U(mt, ct) = u(mt) + ct, (1)
where we assume positive but diminishing marginal utility of medical care. Units
of health care are defined such that the marginal cost of providing one unit of
health care is normalized to unity. In addition, the composite consumption good
has price one. Due to the quasi-linear utility in (1), health care demand is a
decreasing function of the price only, i.e. mt = m
∗(pt). The price of health care
depends on whether the agent has exceeded the deductible and on whether she
is myopic or forward looking.
Consider an agent with the high deductible and assume that the only reason
for exceeding the deductible is a health shock that requires health care expendi-
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tures above the deductible.2 Denote the ex ante probability of this shock with
Π =
∑T
t=1 πt, where πt is the shock probability in subperiod t. We assume that
care expenditures in the shock subperiod are exogenously determined by the ne-
cessity of treating the shock. In other words, the agent only chooses health care
in the subperiods before and after the shock, but not during the shock.
We now discuss the price of health care in this setting. After the shock,
the price is γ. However, the price before the shock depends on whether the
individual is myopic or forward-looking. If individuals are completely myopic,
they only respond to the marginal (or spot) price, which is the price they would
pay for the next additional unit of medical care. In the present case, complete
myopia implies that pt = 1 in all subperiods before the shock. If, on the other
hand, individuals are completely forward-looking, they understand the dynamic
incentives created by the deductible. In our setup, in subperiods before the
shock the expected end-of-year price in period t, peoyt , can be approximated
by (1 − Πt) ∙ 1 + Πt ∙ γ, which is obviously smaller than 1 if Πt > 0. The
probability Πt =
∑T
j=t+1 πj is the cumulated probability that the agent hits the
deductible after period t. The intuition behind the difference in the two prices
is that a completely forward-looking individual who has not received a shock yet
anticipates that with probability Πt a shock may occur in subsequent subperiods,
which would lower his price in all periods after the shock.
Consider now the situation at the change of year, i.e. the subperiods T and
T + 1. For an individual who experiences a shock at some point during the first
year, her relevant price in period T , pT , equals γ. At the beginning of the second
year, the deductible resets, inducing a change in the price which is now given by
pT+1 =



1 if agent is completely myopic
(1 − ΠT+1) + ΠT+1 ∙ γ if agent is completely forward looking
where ΠT+1 =
∑2T
j=T+2 πj. If ΠT+1 is close to 1, pT+1 is close to γ if the agent
is completely forward looking. This is the case for less healthy individuals. If,
on the other hand, ΠT+1 is significantly below 1 (healthy individuals), there is
a significant increase in the price of health care, even if agents are completely
forward looking. Note that ΠT+1 ≈ Π if the number of subperiods is large.
We use this setup to estimate the price responsiveness of the demand for
medical care at the change of year. For an agent with a health shock in the
2Agents who choose the low deductible are assumed to exceed their deductible with proba-
bility one. For this reason we focus on agents who choose the high deductible.
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first year and assuming that she does not experience a health shock in the first
subperiod of the second year, the observed change in health care consumption
before and after the change of year is solely due to the price change. Figure 1
illustrates the dynamics of health care demand during the first period with a
health care shock of magnitude θ̄ in subperiod 2. The price effect we aim to
estimate is denoted by η.
Figure 1: Health care demand before, during, and after the health shock
If we apply the insights from these considerations to a practical context, it
implies that (i) we should study the consumption dynamics at the change of
year, (ii) we should consider those patients who hit the deductible during the
year, and (iii) we must exclude those patients who hit the deductible late in the
year such that observed end-of-year consumption is no longer influenced by the
health shock that initially pushed them over the deductible level.
3 Institutional Background
The Swiss health insurance system can broadly be classified as “managed com-
petition”. It consists of mandatory insurance, which is regulated by government,
and supplementary insurance, which is free-market oriented. The former domi-
nates the health insurance system because it covers an extensive range of medical
services and pharmaceutical products. Mandatory insurance plans are offered by
about 60 private insurance companies, but are subject to strong government reg-
ulation. Insurers may not make profits on mandatory insurance plans and are
obliged to accept all patients who wish to enroll regardless of health status, age,
sex, etc. Apart from the baseline contract, most insurers offer several forms of
6
managed-care plans (e.g. PPO, HMO) which, for example, restrict the patients’
choice of physicians in exchange for lower premiums. Premiums may vary by
region and across the three age groups <18, 18–25 and ≥25 years, but not within
these age groups.3 Adult patients can freely choose among several deductible lev-
els (normally CHF 300, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 and 2500).4 All contracts are on
an individual basis, hence there are no family-related shared deductibles. While
premiums are decreasing in the deductible level, the maximum reduction relative
to the premium associated with the baseline deductible of CHF 300 is subject
to regulation.5 For medical costs exceeding the deductible, all individuals face a
co-payment rate of 10%, which drops to zero after the co-payments exceed the
stop-loss amount of CHF 700. As an important feature of the system, individ-
uals can change insurance company, switch to another plan and/or adjust the
deductible level only at the beginning of every new calendar year, provided that
these changes are applied for by November 30th in the preceding year.6 As a
consequence, the insurance period corresponds to the calendar year, which also
means that the deductible resets at the beginning of every new year. This fea-
ture implies that people exceeding the deductible in a given year experience a
discontinuous rise in the price of medical care at the beginning of the subsequent
year.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Construction of the Dataset
The data is drawn from the records of a large Swiss health insurance company
with roughly half a million customers and covers the time period from 2008
to 2011. It includes all individual insurance claims from patients enrolled in
mandatory health insurance plans. For each claim, we observe medical costs, the
number of visits, beginning and end of treatment, the type of service (inpatient
or outpatient treatment, laboratory, drugs, physiotherapy, etc.) and the type of
provider (hospital, physician, pharmacy, etc.). For each patient, we have infor-
mation on sex, age, region of residence, choice of insurance plan and deductible,
and the periods of enrollment.
3The exact age-group cut-offs are determined by birthday dates. According to federal
regulations, premiums usually rise on the patient’s 18th and 25th birthday.
4The deductible levels for children (age 18 and younger) are lower.
5The maximum premium reduction is 80% of the difference in deductibles.
6Exceptionally, an increase in the deductible can be filed until December 31st of the pre-
ceding year.
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In the analysis below, we will study the evolution of health care utilization
across time using day-level data. We therefore need a sensible mechanism of al-
locating the costs of a treatment across the observed treatment spell because we
have no information as to how and when costs are incurred within the treatment
spell. Of course, if the treatment spell is only a single day, the observed costs are
simply allocated to this day. (This is the case for about 64% of all treatments.)
However, if the treatment spell involves more than one day, we decide to spread
the costs uniformly across the days of the treatment spell. For example, if a
patient obtained outpatient care from September 1st to September 20th, which
involved several consultations and a total bill of CHF 500, we allocate costs of
CHF 25 to each of the 20 days of the treatment spell. This procedure also has
the advantage that undesired “calendar effects” arising from the billing behavior
of health care providers are eliminated: certain lengthy or recurring treatments
(e.g. old-age care, physiotherapy, treatments for chronically ill patients) are of-
ten found to be terminated on the last day of the month, but a new treatment
spell re-starts on the next day. Health care providers do this most likely for
reasons of accounting.7 As a result, we observe substantial heaping in the num-
ber of recorded ends of treatment on certain days (typically on the last day of
the month, and more markedly, on the last day of the quarter). By spreading
health care costs uniformly across spells ensures that such accounting effects are
eliminated.
From the patient pool, we only select patients who were enrolled in mandatory
health insurance during the entire two-year period under consideration (because
we require two consecutive years for the analysis). This excludes patients who
died, emigrated or immigrated, as well as those who were enrolled at another in-
surance company in one of the two years. Moreover, we only include patients who
are at least 18 years of age. In addition, we exclude women who had childbirth-
related medical costs because these are exempt from the deductible. These selec-
tion criteria produce our baseline sample which comprises about 360,000 people
in the two-year period 2009–2010. (The sample sizes are comparable in the other
periods 2008–2009 and 2010–2011.)
For the main part of the empirical analysis, we focus on the subset of pa-
tients in the baseline sample who exceed their deductible level during the first
year of the two-year period. These individuals are henceforth referred to as
“crossers”, whereas those who remain below the deductible are referred to as
7Note that all treatment spells must be terminated on December 31th at the latest because
the deductible period ends on that day. Therefore, there are no treatment spells in the data
that span over two calendar years.
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“non-crossers”. In accordance with the theoretical discussion above, we restrict
the sample of crossers in two ways. First, we exclude patients who hit the de-
ductible late in the year (October to December), which applies to 8% of the
sample. This ensures that a comparison of health care expenditure before and
after the turn of the year is not confounded by shocks that occur at the end of
the year. Otherwise, declining costs around the change of year due to a gradual
recovery from a health shocks would be mistakenly attributed to the effect of the
price change. Appendix A presents some suggestive evidence that supports this
notion. Second, to make sure that patients who experience a permanent dete-
rioration in their latent health status do not confound the analysis, we exclude
patients who alter their deductible level in the second year (4% of the sample).
This procedure is consistent with our theoretical framework because deductible
choice is informative on health status (i.e. the probability of health care shocks).
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
For the analysis, we split the sample in three groups according to the deductible
level and henceforth define these groups as follows: high (at least CHF 1500),
medium (CHF 500 and 1000) and low (CHF 300).8 Table 1 summarizes de-
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Whole Sample (Year 2009)
deductible group high medium low
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
annual medical costs (CHF) 1077 (3973) 4677 (9312) 5395 (10147)
annual # visits 3.62 (8.04) 11.39 (15.73) 13.71 (17.26)
age in years 41.95 (15.78) 57.76 (19.01) 53.76 (21.52)
female 0.41 0.56 0.60
share of crossers 0.14 0.68 0.83
# observations 85,838 149,576 124,113
Notes: The sample is the entire adult population (18 and above) who is enrolled
for mandatory health insurance in the period 2009–2010.
scriptive statistics from our baseline sample in 2009 across the three groups. As
explained above, this sample includes adults who are enrolled in the period 2009–
2010 and contains thus both crossers and non-crossers. It can be clearly seen
that average health care costs and utilization is higher, the lower the deductible
level. This confirms our expectations and is consistent with the notion that de-
8In the high-deductible group, 58% have the CHF 1500 deductible, 12% have the CHF
2000 deductible and 30% have the CHF 2500 deductible. In the medium-deductible group, the
deductible level CHF 500 is predominant with a share of 84%.
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ductible choice depends on health status.9 For instance, annual medical costs in
the medium-deductible and low-deductible groups are about 5 to 6 times higher
than in the high-deductible group. Correspondingly, the share of individuals hit-
ting their deductible level is very low in the latter group compared to the two
former groups. In addition, we observe that younger people as well as males are
markedly more likely to choose a high deductible level.
Since our empirical analysis focuses only on individuals who hit their de-
ductible during the calendar year, we now present descriptive statistics only for
this subsample (the crossers) in Table 2.10 We note an interesting difference to
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Only Crossers (Year 2009)
deductible group high medium low
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
annual medical costs (CHF) 7196 (9416) 7364 (11365) 6519 (11131)
annual # visits 18.37 (15.91) 17.03 (17.31) 16.72 (17.79)
age 53.13 (17.89) 62.53 (17.99) 53.86 (20.19)
female 0.49 0.60 0.62
calendar day 141.47 (75.14) 89.89 (70.06) 74.58 (65.72)
of hitting deductible
# observations 6,976 24,989 26,425
Notes: This table reports statistics for the subsample of crossers in 2009, i.e. those
who hit the deductible. In addition, those who change the deductible level and
those who exceed the deductible late in the year (from October to December) are
excluded.
the (unconditional) baseline sample in Table 1: among those who exceed their de-
ductible, annual expenditure and visits are similar across groups. This suggests
that conditional on hitting the deductible, the average severity of health shocks
does not depend much on the chosen deductible. Another interesting (though
not very surprising) finding for the high-deductible group is that crossers are
much older compared to the unconditional sample. The crossers are therefore
not a random sample from the baseline sample.
To illustrate the dynamics of health care costs in the context of crossing
the deductible level, we compute average health care expenditure relative to the
point in time when the deductible level was hit. Figure 2 shows average costs
9Several empirical studies for the Swiss case have shown that roughly 75% of the health care
expenditure differences across deductible groups can be explained by selection effects (Gerfin
and Schellhorn, 2006; Trottmann et al., 2012).
10Note that we draw random subsamples of size 30,000 from the medium-deductible and low-
deductible crossers, respectively (before applying the sample selection criteria). The reason is
that we have to construct day-level time series panels in the empirical analysis below. An
analysis of the full samples would result in prohibitively large datasets.
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Figure 2: Average Costs Before and After Exceeding the Deductible (Year
2009)
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The sample includes individuals crossing  the deductible mid-year (May to August)
per calendar week relative to the week in which the deductible is hit in the year
2009. The sample consists of crossers who exceed the deductible mid-year (May
to August) such that we can analyze the before-and-after dynamics within a
calendar year. As we can see, costs remain on a low level until a few weeks prior
to hitting the deductible level and rise sharply one week before the deductible
level is reached. After hitting the deductible, costs begin to decline rapidly. This
is evidence that the health shocks are, at least on average, transitory in nature.
Note also that costs remain on a higher level than before the shock. Overall, the
average dynamics observed here are consistent with the implied demand functions
in equation (??): First, costs are low when the price is high and no health shock
occurs. Second, when a shock occurs, costs jump up sharply. And third, costs
decline quickly after the shock, but remain on a higher level than before the
shock, which is consistent with a higher level of health care consumption in the
face of a lower price.
4.3 Evolution of Spot Prices and Health Care Costs
When moving to the next calendar year, crossers experience a sharp and discon-
tinuous rise in the spot price of health care. The price either jumps from the
co-payment rate (10%) or the stop-loss rate (0%) back to the full out-of-pocket
11
price (100%). Note that we calculate the daily spot price for each individual
based on day-level consumption of medical care. Due to the discrete-time set-
ting, this variable is defined as either the realized price of medical care (if costs
are positive) or the hypothetical price (if costs are zero) on each day.11
Figure 3 plots the evolution of average daily spot prices of medical care before
and after the change of year. In general, mean daily prices are monotonically
decreasing during the year because on each day some additional individuals ex-
perience health shocks that push their health costs past the deductible level and
consequently lower the average spot price of medical care. Note that, in all
graphs, the kink on October 1st is by design because we have excluded all pa-
tients who hit the deductible from October to December (see discussion above).
As the calendar year changes, the spot price jumps back to unity because the
deductible resets for everyone. Note that the magnitude of the jump in the spot
price differs very little across deductible groups. However, the dynamics during
the year differ significantly; the average spot price in the medium-deductible and
low-deductible groups decline at a much faster rate than in the high-deductible
group. First, this is because lower deductibles are hit more quickly, everything
else being equal. The second reason is that people with high deductibles expe-
rience fewer (or less severe) health shocks that push them over the deductible
level.
Figure 4 plots average daily costs across time for each of the three deductible
groups. The graphs reveal some important features of our time-series panel data.
First, the daily averages on a markedly lower level are Saturdays and Sundays
and reflect the fact that health care utilization on weekends is lower due to lower
availability relative to weekdays. Hence, there is a large short-term variation in
the data. Second, the data before and after the change of year exhibits a funnel-
shaped pattern with a cluster of extremely low daily health care costs. This
effect is due to the Christmas and New Year break during which accessibility
11For each individual i and each day t, we calculate the spot price as the realized price of
health care consumption in case of positive consumption on this day and as the marginal price
in case of no consumption on this day. Denote di the deductible, sli the stop-loss, yit the
health care expenditure on day t, and yti the cumulated health care expenditures up to day t.
The spot price is then defined as follows:
pit =



1 if yti < di
1 ∙ di−y
t−1
i
yit
+ 0.1 ∙ y
t
i−di
yit
if yt−1i < di and y
t
i > di
0.1 if yt−1i ≥ di and y
t
i < sli
0.1 ∙ sli−y
t−1
i
yit
+ 0 ∙ y
t
i−sli
yit
if yt−1i < sli and y
t
i > sli
0 if yt−1i ≥ sli
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Figure 3: Evolution of Average Daily Spot Prices
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Notes: This figure shows average daily spot prices across deductible groups. The
sample includes crossers who hit the deductible before October 2009 and keep the
same deductible level in the two years.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Average Health Care Costs
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(b) medium deductible
0
10
20
30
40
av
er
ag
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
os
ts
 (
C
H
F
)
01jul2009 01oct2009 01jan2010 01apr2010 01jul2010
date
 95%-CI of daily averages  daily averages
(c) low deductible
Notes: This figure shows average daily health care costs across deductible groups.
The sample includes crossers who hit the deductible before October 2009 and keep
the same deductible level in the two years.
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and availability of non-emergency health care services is limited. Third, there
are some seasonality patterns common to all deductible groups with troughs
around August 1st and October 1st. The first is most likely due to the summer
vacation break. The second trough is due to the exclusion of people who hit the
deductible from October to December. In the first half-year of 2010, by contrast,
average daily costs do generally not exhibit such seasonality patterns and thus
fluctuate much less. Finally, comparing costs before and after the change of year,
it appears that average costs drop to a lower level in the high-deductible group,
while this effect is much less pronounced or absent in the other groups. This
can be taken as prima facie evidence that patients with high deductibles respond
more strongly the changes in the price of health care.
4.4 Empirical Framework
The aim of the empirical analysis is to measure the response of individuals’ health
care consumption to changes in the price. The setting we exploit is a type of
sharp regression discontinuity design (SRD) often used in the treatment effects
literature. However, there is an important difference to the standard SRD: In our
setup, the running variable is time such that we observe all individuals at each
value of the running variable. In the standard setup, an individual is observed
at one value of the running variable. This generates several advantages. First,
our data is a large time-series panel with many observations at each value of
the running variable such that we can estimate local averages with reasonable
precision. Second, causal effects are estimated for the entire sample under study
and not only for those who are near the threshold. The drawback is that we
have to deal with serial correlation and the fact that the lumpiness of health
care expenditure generates a substantive amount of dispersion in combination
with a large fraction of zeros. Another important difference is that we do not
use the data that is very close to the threshold due to the effect of the Christmas
and new-year break on health care utilization documented in Figure 4. Such a
framework has been termed a “donut-RD” design by Barreca et al. (2011) who
study the effect of heaping in the running variable on the estimation of treatment
effects. Shigeoka (2013), for example, uses this approach to perform robustness
checks.
To formalize the empirical framework, we begin by considering two subse-
quent years, with r indicating the change of year and T the number of subperiods
(days) per year. Subperiods are of equal length, t = 1, 2, ..., 2T , and subperiods
with t < r belong to the first year and subperiods with t > r belong to the second
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year. The outcome variable Yit is the health care consumption (as measured by
health care costs) incurred by individual i on day t. We define this outcome by
the function Yit = m(pit, ai, εit), where pit is the relevant price of health care,
ai is an unobserved time-constant effect, for example due to demographics or
education, and εit is a random unobserved shock that varies over time.
In our context, the central question is how m(pit, ai, εit) responds to a change
in pit. Since health care utilization during the holiday season is strongly affected
by the above described calendar effects (as illustrated in Figure 4), we decide
to exclude this period in the before-and-after comparison of health care costs.
Consequently, denote the (hypothetical) prices that we wish to study by pi,r0
and pi,r1 , respectively, where r0 denotes the last day in the first year before the
Christmas break and r1 the first day in the new year after the Christmas break.
The period between r0 and r1 is excluded from the analysis.
As a result, the relevant individual-specific demand response to the change
in prices is
Δi = m(pi,r1 , ai, εi,r1) − m(pi,r0 , ai, εi,r0) (2)
If we integrate over the population in a given subperiod, ai is automatically
integrated out and thus plays no role in estimating average demand responses.
In other words, controlling for time-constant covariates is superfluous because the
same individuals are compared before and after the change of year. However,
we must assume that, for some given price pi, changes in εit do not affect the
average demand between subperiods r0 and r1:
E[m(pi, εi,r1) − m(pi, εi,r0)] = 0 (3)
Under this assumption, the average demand response to the price change from
pi,r0 to pi,r1 is simply identified by
E[Δi] = E[Yi,r1 ] − E[Yi,r0 ] (4)
To estimate these quantities in practice, it must be borne in mind that
health care costs are characterized by a large degree of lumpiness and short-
term (within-week) variation. Given a finite sample, simple one-day averages
would result in very noisy estimates of (4). Instead, it appears more sensible to
use smoothing techniques. We therefore use local linear regression (LLR), which
has good bias properties relative to standard kernel estimation at boundary val-
ues of the covariate support (Hahn et al., 2001; Porter, 2003). Considering the
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samples of the two years of data separately, the local linear regression estimator
for some value t = x solves
min
α0,β0
N∑
i=1
r0∑
t=1
1
h
K
(
t − x
h
)
(Yit − α0(x) − (t − x)β0(x))
2 for t ≤ r0
min
α1,β1
N∑
i=1
2T∑
t=r1
1
h
K
(
t − x
h
)
(Yit − α1(x) − (t − x)β1(x))
2 for t ≥ r1
(5)
where K(∙) is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth to be specified. Given the
above minimization problem, τ̂ = α̂1(r1)− α̂0(r0) is the nonparametric estimator
of interest.
In conducting inference, it is crucial to take into account the potential se-
rial correlation (state dependence) of patients’ health care consumption patterns
across time. Therefore, we use a block bootstrap procedure to estimate standard
errors.12 This allows for arbitrary serial correlation patterns of observations
within panels (individuals).
4.5 Results
Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the evolution of average costs before
and after the change of calendar year when average costs are smoothed using
nonparametric estimation. As discussed above, we have excluded the time spell
affected by the Christmas break, during which health care utilization is markedly
different than in any other time of year. For this reason, r0 is set to be the last
Friday prior to Christmas and r1 is the Monday of the second complete calendar
week of January. We include 180 days of data before and after the change of
year, respectively, such that the estimation window depicted is one year. The
local linear regression is estimated with a triangular kernel.13 Daily average costs
are included for comparison and can be interpreted as nonparametric estimates
with h → 0. We see that the LLR estimator is effective in “smoothing out” the
short-term variation in the data, since the regression function is, for instance,
not affected by the lower utilization at weekends. Panel (a) shows that, in the
high-deductible group, the change of calendar year coincides with a discernable
12Note that the serial correlation problem disappears asymptotically because h → 0 as
N → ∞, but in a finite sample it appears important to correct for clustering.
13The bandwidth is set to h = 30 in all regressions. The same bandwidth is used to facilitate
the comparison of results across samples. The value has been chosen on the basis of a series of
optimal bandwidth calculations using the plug-in method, which suggested bandwidth values
in a range around 30.
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Figure 5: Average Health Care Costs At the Change of Year (2009/2010)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
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(c) low deductible
Notes: This figure shows average costs estimated from daily means (green dots) and
LLR (blue line) using a triangular kernel and bandwidth 30. The sample excludes
the Christmas break.
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drop in health care costs. In contrast, the drop is less distinct in the groups with
lower deductibles (Panels b and c). The figures for the two-year periods before
(2008/2009) and after (2010/2011) are included in Appendix B and present a
very similar picture.
In a next step, we produce numerical estimates of average prices and average
costs of medical care before and after the change of year. In accordance with
the previous discussion, we estimate both spot prices and end-of-year prices. To
measure average spot prices on both sides of the threshold, we simply compute
sample averages on the days defined by r0 and r1. The end-of-year price on the
left of the threshold (i.e. at the end of the first year) is equivalent to the spot
price. The question is as to how to estimate the expected end-of-year price on
the right of the threshold, i.e. at the beginning of the second year. Since we only
require an average estimate, we take the realized end-of-year price as a proxy for
the expected end-of-year price.14 To estimate average costs at the threshold, we
use the LLR estimator specified in (5).
4.5.1 Change of Year Estimates
Table 3 presents numerical estimates of average costs and average prices of med-
ical care on both sides of the threshold 2009/2010 in the sample of crossers.
Standard errors are estimated with a nonparametric block bootstrap based on
1,000 replications. We see that the average spot price is around 0.08 is all three
deductible groups at the end of the year which suggests that about 80% of the
patients in each sample are in the co-payment region with a spot price of 0.1
and 20% are beyond the stop-loss with a spot price of zero. The average spot
price is close to unity after the change of year such that the spot price changes
by 0.8–0.9. This translates into a relative change of about 11 for each deductible
group. Looking at the change in the end-of-year price, however, we find stark
differences across deductible groups: In the high-deductible group, the change
is 0.46 and thus much larger than in the lower deductible groups (0.08–0.10).
Consequently, the relative change of the end-of-year price is about 5 times larger
for the high deductible group (and about half the size of the relative change of
the spot price).
14The realized end-of-year price is the spot price at the end of the year. Thus, the estimate
is based on the average spot price on day r1 in the second year.
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Table 3: Estimation Results at Change of Year (2009/2010)
deductible: high below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.080 0.990 0.909** 11.302**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.074)
end-of-year price 0.080 0.541 0.461** 5.725**
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.073)
total costs 19.278 14.095 −5.184** −0.269**
(0.937) (0.935) (1.193) (0.054)
outpatient costs 6.586 5.116 −1.470** −0.223**
(0.335) (0.313) (0.432) (0.059)
inpatient costs 6.187 3.671 −2.516** −0.407**
(0.765) (0.506) (0.883) (0.103)
drug costs 4.425 2.831 −1.594** −0.360**
(0.270) (0.234) (0.306) (0.056)
number of patients (N): 6,976
deductible: medium below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.075 0.931 0.856** 11.431**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.047)
end-of-year price 0.075 0.175 0.100** 1.336**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025)
total costs 24.046 21.723 −2.323** −0.097**
(0.515) (0.474) (0.637) (0.025)
outpatient costs 6.408 6.206 −0.202 −0.031
(0.168) (0.150) (0.206) (0.032)
inpatient costs 7.339 7.555 0.215 0.029
(0.386) (0.351) (0.493) (0.066)
drug costs 7.583 5.255 −2.328** −0.307**
(0.269) (0.177) (0.284) (0.029)
number of patients (N): 24,989
deductible: low below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.078 0.906 0.829** 10.660**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036)
end-of-year price 0.078 0.154 0.076** 0.982**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020)
total costs 22.121 20.849 −1.272 −0.058
(0.529) (0.728) (0.773) (0.034)
outpatient costs 6.100 6.154 0.054 0.009
(0.141) (0.167) (0.203) (0.033)
inpatient costs 6.560 6.918 0.358 0.055
(0.385) (0.769) (0.815) (0.124)
drug costs 6.498 4.961 −1.537** −0.237**
(0.201) (0.185) (0.246) (0.033)
number of patients (N): 26,425
Notes: The table contains nonparametric estimates of average outcomes
and prices before and after the change of year excluding the Christmas
break. Average price estimates are based on the data from the corre-
sponding day. Outcome estimates are based on LLR with a triangular
kernel and h = 30. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block
bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
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Table 3 also presents estimates of total health care costs and its three most
important sub-components: outpatient care, inpatient care and drugs. Recall
that the outcomes are measured in daily costs per person. A number of in-
teresting findings emerge. First, the absolute and relative response in demand
to the change of year (as measured by total health care costs) is increasing in
the deductible. In the high-deductible group, for instance, average health costs
drop from 19 to 14 CHF, which corresponds to a decline of 27%. The economic
significance of this number is considerable: it implies that high-deductible pa-
tients adjust their health care consumption quite strongly in response to the
jump in the price. In comparison, the drop only amounts to 10% in the medium-
deductible group and is insignificant in the low-deductible group. Second, drug
costs decrease significantly in all deductible groups (they are the only driver of
the significant negative effect for total costs in the medium deductible group).
In relative terms, drug costs are reduced by 24% (low deductible group) to 36%
(high deductible group). Third, outpatient and inpatient costs are reduced sig-
nificantly in the high deductible group. Interestingly, this reduction is most pro-
nounced for inpatient costs (it amounts to half of the reduction of total costs).
We come back to this result below.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix B contain the same analysis for the episodes
2008/2009 and 2010/2011, respectively. The findings appear very similar and do
not change any of the conclusions drawn from the sample of 2009/2010 that we
have discussed above. The only notable exception is a significant reduction of
total costs in the low deductible group in 2010/2011.
4.5.2 Elasticity Calculations
In the next step, we compute elasticities with respect to the two prices: the spot
price and the end-of-year price. We use arc-elasticities, which are defined as
η =
(m1 − m0)/(12 [m1 + m0])
(p1 − p0)/(12 [p1 + p0])
, (6)
rather than the ordinary elasticity formula, for two reasons. First, we have a
setting with large discrete changes in the price in combination with a base point
close to zero. Taken together, a percentage change in the price from, say, 0.08 to
1 equals 1150%, while a change in the opposite direction (from 1 to 0.08) would
only equal 92%. Arc-elasticities evaluate the changes relative to the midpoint
of the two points and are thus base independent. In the above example, the
price change relative to the midpoint is 170% regardless of the direction of the
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Table 4: Estimated Elasticities (2009/2010)
deductible: high medium low
est. st.err. est. st.err. est. st.err.
total costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.183** (0.043) −0.060** (0.016) −0.035 (0.022)
E-O-Y price −0.210** (0.049) −0.127** (0.034) −0.090 (0.055)
outpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.148** (0.043) −0.019 (0.019) 0.005 (0.020)
E-O-Y price −0.170** (0.050) −0.040 (0.040) 0.013 (0.050)
inpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.300** (0.098) 0.017 (0.039) 0.032 (0.068)
E-O-Y price −0.344** (0.113) 0.036 (0.083) 0.081 (0.175)
drug costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.259** (0.049) −0.213** (0.024) −0.159** (0.025)
E-O-Y price −0.296** (0.056) −0.453** (0.051) −0.407** (0.064)
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block bootstrapped us-
ing 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
change. Second, arc-elasticities are widely used in other studies, most notably
in the analysis of the RAND health insurance experiment (Keeler and Rolph,
1988). Using arc-elasticities thus facilitates the comparison of our results with
the RAND benchmark.15
Generally, the interpretation of the following elasticity estimates is not
straightforward because the observed demand response can occur for two rea-
sons. First, if the price falls to a lower level due to hitting the deductible, the
individual consumes more health care. This behavior relates to the traditional
concept of the price elasticity of demand which suggests that patients consume
health care they would not have consumed if the price had not dropped. Sec-
ond, the dynamic aspect of our setting introduces the possibility of intertemporal
substitution of health care consumption. If the price is low this year and high
next year, it may seem optimal for patients to increase present consumption rel-
ative to future consumption. In other words, the additional consumption this
year would have been consumed next year if the price would not have changed. 16
15Aron-Dine et al. (2013) demonstrate that elasticity estimates can vary substantially de-
pending on whether the traditional definition or the arc-elasticity are estimated.
16Intertemporal substitution is ruled out in the simple theoretical framework of section 2.
In order to incorporate intertemporal substitution health care should be an investment good,
and agents optimally allocate investments to periods with low prices. Because we are not able
to separate the two effects empirically, we did not pursue the investment model further.
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In our setting, both effects are likely to play a role and it does not appear to
be possible to identify the two effects separately. Elasticity estimates for the
baseline episode 2009/2010 are presented in Table 4. Results are produced for
both the spot price and the (realized) end-of-year price. If an individual is com-
pletely myopic, he will only consider the spot price as the basis for his health
care consumption. On the other hand, if an individual is forward-looking, he
will respond to the (expected) end-of-year price. It is, of course, likely that the
typical patient behavior lies somewhere in-between these two polar cases. In this
sense, the elasticity with respect to the spot price can be seen as a lower bound
and the elasticity with respect to the end-of-year price as an upper bound to the
relevant elasticity of health care demand.
We first discuss the results for total health care costs given in the top panel.
For the high-deductible group, we estimate the elasticity of health care costs with
respect to the two price concepts at about −0.2. Interestingly, the elasticities
with respect to the spot price and the end-of-year price are close to each other.
This means that a high-deductible individual reduces his health care demand
by about 20% if the relevant price doubles irrespective of whether he is myopic
or forward-looking. The estimated elasticities are considerably smaller for the
medium-deductible group, and not significantly different from zero for the low-
deductible group. Hence, the responsiveness of health care demand to changes
in prices is stronger, the higher the chosen deductible level and thus the better
the health status. This might be interpreted as some evidence for (partially)
forward-looking behavior. If individuals reacted to spot prices, we would expect
to see similar responses across all deductible groups, because as demonstrated in
Table 3, spot price changes are similar across deductible groups.
Looking at the individual components of health care costs, we find similar
results for the demand of outpatient care as well as for inpatient care. Elasticities
are only significantly different from zero for the high-deductible group. Of course,
the elasticities mirror the estimated percentage changes discussed above. The
rather large elasticity of inpatient care is somewhat surprising. Figure A.5 in
the Appendix shows the estimation result for inpatient care graphically. For the
high-deductible group, there is a large increase in inpatient costs in December.
This may be an indication for at least partial intertemporal substitution. Because
inpatient care is relatively cheap after hitting the deductible, some patients may
be able to bring forward operations that would otherwise have taken place at a
later point (i.e. operations that are not urgent and can be planned). This case
is not moral hazard in the classic sense because the operations would have been
23
performed in any case. However, patients are able to shift the costs of these
operations to the insurance company and hence to society. Furthermore, this
type of intertemporal substitution keeps the high deductible attractive in the
future.
The demand for prescription drugs is more elastic than the demand for total
health care: the estimated elasticities are large and significantly different from
zero across all deductible groups. This finding is surprising for the low deductible
group given that for them the end-of-year price hardly changes. If individuals in
the low deductible group were to react to the spot price instead, there should be
demand responses in the other categories of health care as well. It is possible that
patients with long-term prescriptions have these prescriptions filled as long as the
price is low. However, it seems unlikely that this completely explains the result.
The graphical analysis in Figure A.6 suggests some intertemporal substitution
for the low and medium deductible group because there is a steep increase in
prescription drug expenditures during December. On the other hand, there is no
visible drop in January compared to later months in 2010. This is in contrast to
the findings in Einav et al. (2013a), who document a shift in drug expenditure
from December to January among those with cumulated drug expenditure close
to the donut hole gap in Medicare Part D. A further analysis of this topic is left
for future research.17
4.5.3 Effect Heterogeneity and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we provide additional results to explore effect heterogeneity in
the patient population and to test the sensitivity of our results to the sample
restriction criteria. First, we estimate the elasticities of total health care costs
with respect to prices separately by age groups and gender. We define two age
groups denoted young (age < 55 years) and old (age ≥ 55 years). The results
from the period 2009/2010 are presented in Table 5. It is interesting to observe
that men respond more strongly than women. This heterogeneity across gender
generates a significant response for men with low deductibles. This could be an
indication that men are more prone to moral hazard than women or that they
respond more strongly to the dynamic incentives. Comparing estimates between
17Informal evidence for intertemporal substitution is provided by an interview with the
manager of a large pharmacy. His observation is that there is an above-average demand
for prescription drugs in December even for long-term prescriptions that are valid beyond
December 31. According to him, one reason for this is that patients think that the drugs are
cheaper for them before the deductible resets. This corresponds to strong myopia in individuals’
behavior. One explanation may be salience: consumers are more aware of drug prices because
they usually pay at the pharmacy and get reimbursed later.
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Table 5: Estimated Elasticities by Age and Gender (2009/2010)
deductible: high medium low
est. st.err. est. st.err. est. st.err.
young (age < 55)
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.189∗ (0.076) −0.109** (0.036) −0.104** (0.030)
E-O-Y price −0.207∗ (0.083) −0.164** (0.053) −0.201** (0.057)
old (age ≥ 55)
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.178** (0.048) −0.047** (0.018) 0.003 (0.031)
E-O-Y price −0.219** (0.059) −0.160** (0.062) 0.017 (0.194)
men
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.225** (0.068) −0.071∗ (0.031) −0.105** (0.031)
E-O-Y price −0.254** (0.077) −0.137∗ (0.059) −0.229** (0.068)
women
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.134** (0.048) −0.052** (0.019) 0.005 (0.031)
E-O-Y price −0.156** (0.056) −0.121** (0.044) 0.015 (0.090)
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block bootstrapped us-
ing 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
age groups, the evidence is more mixed; while there is no discernable difference
in the high-deductible group, we find a significant response of younger patients,
but a close-to-zero response of older patients.
Second, we test whether our results are sensitive to the sample restriction of
excluding individuals who alter their deductible level for the second year. For
this purpose, we re-estimate the change in health care demand including these
individuals. Table 6 displays the results based on the period 2009/2010. The
sample of the low-deductible group is nearly the same as before which is indicative
of the fact that they are unlikely to alter their deductible. By contrast, the sample
of the high-deductible group is now considerably larger than before. Comparing
the results between Table 6 and Table 3, we find no qualitative differences. In
addition, the point estimates are remarkably similar with nearly all of the relative
changes being within one percentage point of the original estimates. The only
exception is the change in drug costs in the high-deductible group, which is 5
percentage points lower than before. However, the change in total costs in the
high-deductible group is barely affected (26% compared to 27% before). Thus,
our overall findings are not sensitive to the exclusion of patients who adjust their
deductible level.
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Table 6: Estimation Results Including Deductible Changers (2009/2010)
deductible: high below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
total costs 20.616 15.285 −5.332** −0.259**
(0.821) (0.838) (0.992) (0.043)
outpatient costs 6.869 5.294 −1.575** −0.229**
(0.304) (0.266) (0.388) (0.050)
inpatient costs 6.269 3.810 −2.459** −0.392**
(0.728) (0.479) (0.856) (0.104)
drug costs 5.056 3.477 −1.579** −0.312**
(0.310) (0.303) (0.347) (0.060)
number of patients (N): 8,554
deductible: medium below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
total costs 23.978 21.813 −2.165** −0.090**
(0.559) (0.459) (0.632) (0.025)
outpatient costs 6.360 6.248 −0.112 −0.018
(0.193) (0.163) (0.234) (0.036)
inpatient costs 7.390 7.704 0.314 0.042
(0.391) (0.432) (0.526) (0.072)
drug costs 7.503 5.156 −2.347** −0.313**
(0.272) (0.186) (0.294) (0.031)
number of patients (N): 26,717
deductible: low below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
total costs 21.838 20.542 −1.296 −0.059
(0.510) (0.751) (0.793) (0.036)
outpatient costs 6.048 6.079 0.032 0.005
(0.148) (0.149) (0.197) (0.032)
inpatient costs 6.450 6.802 0.352 0.055
(0.404) (0.692) (0.750) (0.120)
drug costs 6.415 4.886 −1.529** −0.238**
(0.215) (0.164) (0.255) (0.033)
number of patients (N): 26,870
Notes: Individuals altering the deductible level from 2009 to 2010 are
included. Outcome estimates are based on LLR with a triangular ker-
nel and h = 30. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block
bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
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5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed health care demand in the presence of nonlinear pric-
ing which in turn generates dynamic incentives. Nonlinear price schedules are
the result of deductibles and a maximum out-of-pocket payment in the Swiss
health insurance system. Our analysis exploits the institutional regulation that
deductibles apply to a calendar year and reset to the initial level at the start of
the new year. This generates a discrete jump in the price of medical care for
people who have exceeded their deductible level.
We use a regression discontinuity type framework based on daily data to
estimate the change in health care demand right before and right after the turn
of the year. We find that for individuals with high deductibles total health care
demand drops by 27%, which translates into an elasticity of −.21. The decrease
is most pronounced for inpatient care and prescription drugs. By contrast, for
individuals with low deductibles the estimated elasticities are almost zero, with
the exception of prescription drugs. These results may be interpreted as evidence
for forward-looking behavior, because the expected end-of-year price does change
substantially in the high deductible group, but not in the low deductible group.
However, the results for prescription drugs in the low deductible group do not
support the forward-looking hypothesis.
Our results are informative about behavioral responses caused by price
changes induced by the institutional setting. If individuals understand their
health insurance plans, they know that the deductible will reset on January 1st
and should thus be aware of the price change. If they anticipate a higher price in
the next year, or if they are myopic and do not consider the development of the
price during the year, they may bring forward medical care (routine check-ups,
operations that are not urgent). For this reason, it is difficult to separate the ob-
served responses into a true moral hazard effect (health care that would not have
been consumed if the price was higher) and an intertemporal substitution effect
(health care that would have been consumed next year instead of this year). In
this sense, our results are difficult to compare with the literature, especially the
well-known RAND results. The separation of the moral hazard and the substi-
tution effect is left to future research. This would for example require a setting
in which there is only one of the effects by design.
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Appendix
A Excess Costs in January
In this section, we investigate whether individuals who cross their deductible late
in the year are still affected by health shocks in the beginning of the subsequent
year. To do this, we use a similar strategy as Einav et al. (2013a). We consider
all crossers from 2009 and compute the ratio of their health care costs in January
2010 relative to the monthly average from February to December 2010. This ratio
is informative on the health care consumption in January relative to the rest of
the year. Taking the ratio thus “controls” for the heterogeneity in the level of
health care expenditures across individuals. Figure A.1 shows the average ratio
as a function of the calendar month in 2009 in which patients hit their deductible
level (“crossing month”). On average, costs in January are higher relative to the
Figure A.1: Excess Costs in January Relative to Rest of Year
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rest of the year which is due to more intensive health care utilization in the
winter. Indeed, it is very suggestive to compare these “excess January costs”
across the crossing month in 2009. We see clearly that patients who hit their
deductible in December (and November) 2009 have very high costs in January
2010 relative to the rest of the year 2010. In contrast, the ratio is not significantly
different between crossing months from January to October 2009. This provides
30
evidence that health shocks occurring at the end of year have lasting consequences
for health care expenditures at the beginning of the subsequent year. For this
reason, it is sensible to exclude from the analysis those who cross their deductible
late in the year because their consumption in January still appears to be affected
by health shocks.
B Additional Estimation Results (2008/2009
and 2010/2011)
Table A.1: Estimation Results at Change of Year (2008/2009)
deductible: high below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spo55t price 0.080 0.988 0.908** 11.314**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.072)
end-of-year price 0.080 0.518 0.438** 5.457**
(0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.069)
total costs 18.706 15.074 −3.632** −0.194**
(0.804) (0.749) (0.950) (0.046)
outpatient costs 7.044 5.275 −1.769** −0.251**
(0.315) (0.297) (0.364) (0.046)
inpatient costs 4.431 4.523 0.093 0.021
(0.515) (0.652) (0.853) (0.206)
drug costs 4.811 3.087 −1.724** −0.358**
(0.261) (0.177) (0.268) (0.042)
number of patients (N): 6,683
deductible: medium below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.074 0.922 0.848** 11.442**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.041)
end-of-year price 0.074 0.153 0.079** 1.069**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021)
total costs 25.001 23.733 −1.268 −0.051
(0.515) (0.577) (0.730) (0.029)
outpatient costs 6.368 7.074 0.706 0.111
(0.176) (0.396) (0.439) (0.071)
inpatient costs 7.955 8.439 0.484 0.061
(0.407) (0.450) (0.584) (0.074)
drug costs 7.918 5.547 −2.371** −0.299**
(0.295) (0.132) (0.302) (0.028)
number of patients (N): 26,294
deductible: low below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.075 0.888 0.813** 10.844**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.039)
end-of-year price 0.075 0.132 0.057** 0.762**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018)
continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
total costs 22.889 22.055 −0.834 −0.036
(0.475) (0.433) (0.607) (0.026)
outpatient costs 6.285 6.717 0.432 0.069
(0.179) (0.173) (0.233) (0.038)
inpatient costs 6.960 7.122 0.161 0.023
(0.346) (0.354) (0.449) (0.064)
drug costs 7.056 5.432 −1.625** −0.230**
(0.224) (0.174) (0.265) (0.032)
number of patients (N): 27,480
Notes: The table contains nonparametric estimates of average outcomes
and prices before and after the change of year excluding the Christmas
break. Average price estimates are based on the data from the corre-
sponding day. Outcome estimates are based on LLR with a triangular
kernel and h = 30. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block
bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
Table A.2: Estimation Results at Change of Year (2010/2011)
deductible: high below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.080 0.989 0.909** 11.362**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.077)
end-of-year price 0.080 0.515 0.435** 5.439**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.072)
total costs 20.063 14.365 −5.699** −0.284**
(1.115) (0.761) (1.193) (0.048)
outpatient costs 6.864 5.605 −1.260** −0.184**
(0.341) (0.307) (0.400) (0.052)
inpatient costs 6.308 3.572 −2.736** −0.434**
(0.950) (0.593) (1.042) (0.123)
drug costs 4.656 2.958 −1.698** −0.365**
(0.275) (0.224) (0.331) (0.059)
number of patients (N): 6,881
deductible: medium below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
spot price 0.074 0.934 0.860** 11.657**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043)
end-of-year price 0.074 0.161 0.087** 1.182**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022)
total costs 25.862 23.131 −2.732** −0.106**
(0.656) (0.613) (0.792) (0.029)
outpatient costs 7.067 6.819 −0.249 −0.035
(0.188) (0.223) (0.274) (0.039)
inpatient costs 8.629 8.053 −0.575 −0.067
(0.571) (0.417) (0.693) (0.077)
drug costs 7.020 5.274 −1.746** −0.249**
(0.234) (0.214) (0.293) (0.036)
number of patients (N): 25,427
deductible: low below (r0) above (r1) abs. change rel. change
continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
spot price 0.077 0.912 0.835** 10.861**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.039)
end-of-year price 0.077 0.152 0.075** 0.979**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020)
total costs 22.529 20.248 −2.281** −0.101**
(0.499) (0.450) (0.575) (0.024)
outpatient costs 6.634 6.370 −0.264 −0.040
(0.209) (0.179) (0.235) (0.034)
inpatient costs 6.812 6.446 −0.366 −0.054
(0.359) (0.364) (0.474) (0.070)
drug costs 6.295 4.779 −1.516** −0.241**
(0.199) (0.219) (0.280) (0.039)
number of patients (N): 26,522
Notes: The table contains nonparametric estimates of average outcomes
and prices before and after the change of year excluding the Christmas
break. Average price estimates are based on the data from the corre-
sponding day. Outcome estimates are based on LLR with a triangular
kernel and h = 30. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block
bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05
Table A.3: Estimated Elasticities (2008/2009)
deductible: high medium low
est. st.err. est. st.err. est. st.err.
total costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.127** (0.033) −0.031 (0.018) −0.022 (0.016)
E-O-Y price −0.147** (0.039) −0.075 (0.043) −0.067 (0.049)
outpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.169** (0.035) 0.062 (0.037) 0.039 (0.021)
E-O-Y price −0.196** (0.041) 0.151 (0.089) 0.120 (0.065)
inpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price 0.012 (0.114) 0.035 (0.041) 0.014 (0.038)
E-O-Y price 0.014 (0.133) 0.085 (0.101) 0.042 (0.116)
drug costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.257** (0.037) −0.207** (0.023) −0.154** (0.024)
E-O-Y price −0.298** (0.043) −0.505** (0.058) −0.471** (0.074)
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block bootstrapped us-
ing 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Figure A.2: Average Health Care Costs At the Change of Year (2008/2009)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
0
10
20
30
40
av
er
ag
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
os
ts
 (
C
H
F
)
01jul2008 01oct2008 01jan2009 01apr2009 01jul2009
date
 LLR mean estimate  daily averages
 95%-CI of daily averages 
(c) low deductible
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Figure A.3: Average Health Care Costs At the Change of Year (2010/2011)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
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(c) low deductible
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Table A.4: Estimated Elasticities (2010/2011)
deductible: high medium low
est. st.err. est. st.err. est. st.err.
total costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.195** (0.038) −0.065** (0.019) −0.063** (0.016)
E-O-Y price −0.226** (0.045) −0.150** (0.044) −0.162** (0.041)
outpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.119** (0.037) −0.021 (0.023) −0.024 (0.021)
E-O-Y price −0.138** (0.043) −0.048 (0.054) −0.062 (0.054)
inpatient costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.326** (0.112) −0.040 (0.048) −0.033 (0.042)
E-O-Y price −0.379** (0.130) −0.094 (0.112) −0.084 (0.109)
drug costs
implied arc-elasticity w.r.t. the
spot price −0.262** (0.051) −0.166** (0.028) −0.162** (0.031)
E-O-Y price −0.305** (0.059) −0.382** (0.064) −0.416** (0.079)
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses are block bootstrapped us-
ing 1,000 replications. Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
C Estimation for Cost Categories
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Figure A.4: Average Outpatient Costs At the Change of Year (2009/2010)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
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(c) low deductible
Notes: This figure shows average outpatient costs estimated from daily means
(green dots) and LLR (blue line) using a triangular kernel and bandwidth 30. The
sample excludes the Christmas break.
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Figure A.5: Average Inpatient Costs At the Change of Year (2009/2010)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
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(c) low deductible
Notes: This figure shows average inpatient costs estimated from daily means (green
dots) and LLR (blue line) using a triangular kernel and bandwidth 30. The sample
excludes the Christmas break.
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Figure A.6: Average Drug Costs At the Change of Year (2009/2010)
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(a) high deductible
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(b) medium deductible
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(c) low deductible
Notes: This figure shows average drug costs estimated from daily means (green
dots) and LLR (blue line) using a triangular kernel and bandwidth 30. The sample
excludes the Christmas break.
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